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The IMF creates “moral hazard,” when it provides bailouts to countries that face a BOP crisis. Two central 
questions are posed: is moral hazard observable in the data; and, if it is, what is its magnitude?  We search 
for evidence that the unprecedented bailouts of the last decade have changed the investing environment in 
such a way that international investors started believing that their investments were insured. Our events-
study is based on IMF-led events identified as both important and unexpected, such as the bailout loan for 
Mexico in 1995 and the absence of one for Russia in 1998. Our conclusion is negative: no such change in 
the moral hazard effect was observed. We demonstrate that events surrounding the out-of-sample 
Argentinean default (Dec. 2001) support our finding. 
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1.  On Moral Hazard in International Lending 
The last decade has been a decade of spectacular currency, balance-of-
payments and banking crises and equally spectacular and controversial bailouts. 
The problem of moral hazard in international crisis lending has consequently 
become very prominent in policy and academic discussions. A concern with moral 
hazard was one of the principal issues discussed in the Meltzer Commission’s 
report on the International Financial Institutions (Meltzer, 2000).
1  
Evidently, criticism of the International Monetary Fund is widespread; the 
moral hazard issue is only one of several reasons why the IMF faces such hostility 
from professionals and the public and coming from different political persuasions. 
Moral hazard remains as the most prominent reason for criticism against the IMF 
from several prominent researchers and policymakers (e.g., Calomiris, 2000; 
Bordo and Schwartz, 2000; Meltzer, 2000; and Niskanen, 1999). Yet, in spite of 
numerous policy discussions on the topic, very little empirical work to date has 
been done on this issue.
2 
The current literature differentiates between moral hazard on the creditors’ and 
on the debtors’ sides. From the debtors’ perspective, the implied or even explicit 
insurance/bailout enables domestic borrowers to increase their risk exposure 
beyond the optimal level in the absence of insurance, as, in case of a negative 
                                                 
1 See Hutchison (2003) for a description of IMF programs and their size. The term ‘bailout’ is used 
here, as elsewhere in the literature, even though these support packages are subsidized loans that 
are almost always repaid on time. The magnitude of the subsidy is debatable since IMF loans face 
a different default risk than private or even other public lending as IMF loans are almost always 
paid back on time. For analysis of repayment experiences to the IMF, see Aylward and Thorne 
(1998). 
2 The only exceptions of which we are aware are Lane and Phillips (2000), Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2002), Kamin (2002) and Dreher and Vaubel (2001). The last one only examines debtor moral 
hazard and is therefore not directly related to our work. The other three are surveyed in the next 
section.    
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shock that will leave them unable or unwilling to repay in full, they will be at least 
partially bailed out.  
Our work focuses on the other side of a moral hazard in international bailouts 
– namely the creditors’ moral hazard effect. As creditors are aware that they will 
be bailed out in case of a balance-of-payment crisis in an emerging economy, their 
behavior changes. This has often been cited as one of the more apparent stylized 
facts of the East Asian crises – especially since ex post most large international 
lenders were indeed partially bailed out. 
An implied insurance (a bail-out is an ex post insurance policy) of sovereign 
and corporate bond issues or inter-bank lending can result in the following: 
•  An increase in the amount transacted over and above the amount that 
would have been transacted in the absence of such implicit guarantees.  
•  A decrease in the price of loans so that it no longer reflects the true 
(insurance-free) risk borne. 
•  A change in the composition of investment away from uninsured 
investment (e.g., equity) to insured flows (e.g., sovereign bonds).  
•  A change in the composition of international portfolios away from less 
risky but less profitable investment opportunities to more risky but more 
profitable if outcomes are positive. 
These moral hazard effects might imply that IMF-led bailouts lead to sub-
optimal equilibria in which there is both a dead-weight-loss and a redistribution of 
resources away from domestic or foreign taxpayers to the international creditors 
or the sovereign countries that are bailed out.    
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Supporters of these bailouts imply that these concerns are either misplaced, 
exaggerated or alternatively outweighed by other concerns (dynamic consistency 
issues, post crisis large output costs, etc.). In contrast, detractors of the IMF and 
the large bailouts it had orchestrated occasionally blame the very occurrence and 
severity of the recent crises on these moral hazard effects. For discussions of these 
issues see, for example: Dreher and Vaubel, 2001; Eichengreen, 2000; Jeanne, 
1999; Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2001; Kho and Stulz, 1999; Kreuger, 2003; Lerrick 
and Meltzer, 2003; Mussa, 1999; and Rogoff, 1999 and 2002). 
While there remains little doubt that moral hazard considerations are 
theoretically justifiable when international bailouts are concerned it remains to be 
determined whether these concerns have indeed a positive significance. We aim to 
contribute an answer to this question. 
From a positive perspective, a theoretically tight argument for the presence of 
moral hazard as a result of international lending does not imply that the moral 
hazard effect is indeed of major import. It thus becomes apparent that the 
importance of the moral hazard effect should be treated as an empirical question.
3 
                                                 
3 The normative significance of moral hazard concerns is outside the scope of this paper. From a 
normative perspective, other factors that might outweigh these concerns in the decision whether to 
intervene can be the costs of refusing a bail-outs to the debtor country (output costs, distributional 
effects, etc.), costs to the creditors themselves in refusing to bail them out (as in the case of major 
U.S. banks in Mexico 1995) or possible spill-over and contagion effects from default (as in the 
publicly orchestrated private bailing out of LTCM). Also, exogenous constraints that might make 
moral hazard concerns irrelevant might be regulatory and institutional constraints on IMF 
intervention or international or domestic political-economy issues related to the demand or supply 
of bailouts. Furthermore, there is a clear trade-off between moral hazard concerns and other 
considerations so it might be the case that the socially optimal level of moral hazard is positive 
(i.e., in a second-best world, it might be optimal for a multilateral financial institution that 
maximizes world welfare to choose to create a moral hazard effect by supplying insurance). Some 
of the normative aspects of the moral hazard effect in international lending/bailouts are examined 
in Atkeson (1991), Corsetti et al. (2003), Döbeli (2002), Ghosal and Miller (2002), Noy (2003), 
and Powel and Arozamena (2003).    
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Here, we examine empirical evidence of a moral hazard effect as a result of 
large international post-crisis bailouts. The few papers that have dealt with this 
question empirically have found conflicting results. While Lane and Phillips 
(2000) and Kamin (2002) do not find much evidence of a significant moral hazard 
effect, Dell'Arricia et al. (2002) interpret similar data differently and conclude that 
there is a noticeable moral hazard effect in international debt markets. It is the 
intent of this paper to re-examine the data. We use a couple of different statistical 
methodologies and a different method for aggregating data than is used by any of 
the previous papers. Furthermore, we critically examine possible explanations, 
other than moral hazard, that might account for our empirical findings. Thirdly, 
we exploit newer data, most importantly surrounding the December 2001 
Argentinean sovereign default to further our research agenda.    
 
Critics of IMF bailouts cite the unprecedented scale of the Mexican bailout of 
1995 as the watershed in moral-hazard-inducing bailouts. Accordingly, we should 
observe changes in international capital markets following that event and the 
introduction of even larger bailout programs in East Asia in 1997-8. In Figure 1, 
we present data on the volume of international capital flows in the 1990s. We 
indeed observe a very pronounced increase in capital flows up to and including 
1997. But, when divided into its various components, almost all of this increase is 
attributed to a boom in foreign direct investment. Bond issues, flows that are most 
likely to 'enjoy' implicit insurance through those bailouts, do not show any marked 
trend over that time period. Bank lending, which also seems to be a (partially)    
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'insured' type of flow remarkably does show a trend that is consistent with a moral 
hazard story. In annual data, between 1995 and 1997 bank lending increased 
significantly. Then, it leveled of in 1998 and dropped precipitously in 1999. Thus, 
at least in the case of bond flows, we can conclude that an additional moral hazard 
effect created by the Mexican bailout did not manifest itself in increase in the 
volume of 'insured' flows. 
  Furthermore, by decomposing flows by regions, we observe that much of 
the volatility in bank lending is driven by local trends and does not represent a 
global phenomenon (see figure 2). Bank lending to East Asia started dropping 
already in 1997 and inflows turned to large outflows in 1998. In contrast, bank 
lending peaked dramatically in 1998 for Latin America but bank flows dried up 
completely in 1999.  This contrast seems to contradict the standard moral hazard 
hypothesis that will imply similar changes in behavior of flows worldwide in 
reaction to perceived changes in the implied insurance offered by international 
multilateral institutions. Bond flows appear to be even more volatile and a moral 
hazard framework cannot exclusively explain trends there either (figure 3). 
 
The absence of any evidence on the moral hazard effect on quantities leaves 
us with the possibility that moral hazard manifested itself in its effect on the price 
of insured flows, namely spreads. These spreads—the difference between the 
interest rate of foreign currency denominated bonds and a benchmark rate—are 
the focus of section 3. 
  Using a different methodology and different aggregated data than what has    
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been previously used in research on this topic, we contribute in a few distinct 
ways: First, by using a different methodology, we exploit higher-powered tests to 
examine the moral hazard hypothesis. Second, by looking in some detail at 
changes in market perceptions around the time of events we are able to interpret 
results differently. Third, by using data surrounding the IMF's decision to support 
and subsequently to abandon Argentina to default on its debt, we are able to shed 
additional light on the extent of moral hazard during the last decade. Fourth we 
also examine the quantities of capital flows, disaggregated by their type, to further 
our understanding of the possible effects of moral hazard. 
Section 2 provides a literature review on previous theoretical research on IMF 
crisis interventions as well as on the empirical determinants of spreads and of all 
existing empirical research of which we are aware on moral hazard in 
international multilateral lending. Section 3 outlines the event-study methodology 
used, section 4 discusses the data and present stylized facts, section 5 presents our 




A rapidly growing theoretical literature on currency crises deals with the 
moral hazard issue. Dooley (2000), in one of the earliest contributions, describes 
an insurance model and sees the implied insurance (partially financed by these 
rescue packages) as the driving force behind the outpouring of capital flows into 
emerging markets and the reversal of these flows that is occasioned by shifting    
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expectations as the defining moment of the crises themselves.
4  
More recent papers that incorporate moral hazard explicitly into an 
international macroeconomic model of lending are Aizenman and Turnovsky 
(2002), Corsetti et al. (2003), Dekle and Kletzer (2001), Döbeli (2002), Levy-
Yeyati (1999), and Powel and Arozamena (2003).  
Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002) includes both a lender moral hazard and a 
sovereign risk constraint. Their work examines the effects of reserve requirements 
on borrowing levels and introduces a welfare metric to evaluate various policies. 
Levy-Yeyati (1999) shows how a deposit insurance scheme in the lending country 
will lead to what he calls an ‘over-lending syndrome’ – a quantity rather than a 
price effect.
5  
Dekle and Kletzer’s (2001) model explicitly introduces intermediation (banks) 
and includes a domestic lenders’ moral hazard effect through a deposit insurance 
scheme. The paper demonstrates the mechanism that leads to a financial (banking) 
crisis. Corsetti et al. (2003) and Ghosal and Miller (2002) concentrate on the 
IMF’s debtors’ moral hazard. In contrast, Döbeli and Vanini (2002) argue, based 
on a game theoretic model, that creditors’ moral hazard will lead to an increase in 
the quantity lent above the social optimum and should therefore be an important 
policy concern. A debtors’ moral hazard, in contrast, will lead to the opposite 
effect in their model. 
 
On the Empirics of Bond Spreads 
                                                 
4 The insurance has to be accompanied by lax regulation that enables domestic borrowers (banks) 
to siphon off (maybe to off-shore centers) some of these borrowed monies. 
5 The name is used as a contrast with McKinnon and Pill’s (1997) ‘overborrowing syndrome’.    
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A number of empirical papers have looked at the determinants of emerging 
markets’ spreads (of US$ denominated debt vs. some benchmark rate), but do not 
look specifically at the moral hazard question. Nevertheless, their methodology 
and findings provides us with a benchmark from which to develop a more 
complete identification of the determinants-of-spreads model parameters that we 
require for our empirical exercise. 
Several papers investigate empirical models and identify variables that 
determine country specific bond spreads. Some identify various aggregate and 
country-specific economic variables that effect spreads thorough their influence 
on perceived  (or actual) risk (e.g., Min, 1998). Others use credit risk indices as a 
proxy for the perceived risk in a sovereign borrower and examine only those 
indices and additional bond-specific variables as the determinants of spreads (e.g., 
Larraín et al., 1997; and Cline and Barnes, 1997). Eichengreen and Mody (2000), 
in the model closest to ours, use both macroeconomic variables and the orthogonal 
component of publicly available credit ratings as determining spreads. 
Another strand in this literature identifies various global indicators that might 
affect global demand or supply of emerging market bonds and thus effect their 
price (spread). Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Min (1998), for example, find 
that industrial country interest rates that theoretically should affect the aggregate 
demand for emerging market bonds and the implied creditworthiness of borrowers 
are insignificant in their regressions. Cline and Barnes (1997) suggest that the 
increasing global supply of capital available to emerging markets is part of the 
reason for the sustained decrease in spreads between mid 1995 (following the    
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Mexican crisis) and October 1997 (the Asian crisis). As they point out, in order 
for this argument to be valid the increase in supply cannot be matched by an 
increasing demand for capital by emerging markets borrowers for spreads to 
decrease. Without these demand and supply effects, we assume that spreads 
should only reflect perceived default risks. 
The implied assumption is, of course, that while spreads are determined by the 
perceived level of risk associated with each bond these are in turn determined by 
whatever variables are observable to market participants (buyers and sellers) at the 
time of issue or of trade (for secondary market spreads). In our work, we 
investigate the resulting estimation errors, which we cannot attribute to these 
observable fundamentals. We attempt to associate these errors with a moral hazard 
effect.  
Mauro et al. (2002) find that during the 1990s spreads were co-moving more 
than in the previous ‘global’ era (1870-1913) and that these co-movements tend to 
be mostly related to global events and not to country specific ones; their 
interpretation is that investors today pay less attention to country specific 
information but a moral hazard interpretation can be applied as well. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) try to explain the continuous drop in spreads 
following the Mexican crisis all the way up to the summer of 1997.
6 They suggest 
two different explanations: the first is that markets are perfectly efficient and 
frictionless and the decline in spreads is a result of a decline in expected default 
risk. From the early 1990s many developing countries attempted to put their 
                                                 
6 While this observation is generally accurate, Eichengreen and Mody (2000), for example, 
observe that following the Mexican crisis Latin American spreads actually rose while East Asian 
ones continued to decline.    
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monetary and fiscal affairs in order – more so as the apparent costs of the Mexican 
crisis came into light. The other explanation, which they seem to support, points to 
more liberal financial market conditions in lending countries and a possible 
arbitrary shift in pricing behavior (an irrational exuberance) on the part of 
international lenders; both leading to decreasing spreads. Their result seems to tie 
in with the Mauro et al. (2000) argument that investors, at least up to August 
1998, seem to be paying less attention to country specific information. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) stress that their model of the effect of 
fundamentals on the demand and supply of bonds and consequently on their 
spreads gives only a very partial explanation for spreads. They interpret this large 
residual as market sentiment. We attempt to test whether the residual we obtain is 
actually related to a moral hazard explanation – the likelihood that these bonds are 
completely or partially insured. Interestingly, they find that the residual is 
especially large for the period following the Tequila-Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. 
This seems consistent with popular commentary that the large Mexican bailout 
package created a moral hazard effect as it increased the implied insurance 
available for sovereign debt. 
 
While the papers mentioned in the previous section occasionally presented 
findings that appear to us to be consistent with a moral hazard interpretation, only 
three papers of which we are aware attempted to investigate directly the presence 
and the magnitude of a bailout induced, IMF-moral-hazard effect. The three are 




Lane and Phillips (2000) 
Lane and Phillips (2000) is, to our knowledge, the first paper that attempts to 
look directly at the magnitude of the moral hazard that results from IMF financing 
(bailouts). As they interpret it, their preliminary work suggests that even if there is 
an IMF moral hazard effect, its magnitude is not very significant. They find that 
spreads do not change much in response to changes in perception of the IMF 
willingness to provide bailouts. They base their finds on an examination of 
secondary market spreads for dollar denominated bonds following a series of 
events they identify as affecting the perception of international investors on 
available financing for bail-outs. 
In almost all the events they identify they do not discern any significant 
change in the time series of spreads (defined as a change of more than one 
standard deviation). Lane and Phillips (2000) argue that as IMF financing is small 
(as ratio to GDP or to external debt stock), and since financing from other sources 
is limited as well, it is not clear to investors whether they will not be too far back 
in the queue. The perceived bailout probabilities (a moral hazard effect) will thus 
only be indirectly incorporated into the perceived default risk if a possible bailout 
affects the probability of default ex ante. Notably, Lane and Phillips (2000) do 
find a significant movement of spreads following the Russian default (and the 
glaring absence of an IMF bail-out in that case).  
 
Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel and Zettelmeyer (2002)    
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In contrast with Lane and Phillips (2000), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2000) focus on a 
single event, the Russian default of August 1998, but use a more detailed 
empirical model to test their hypotheses. 
They gather a balanced panel data-set for secondary market spreads and argue 
that any event that increases the perceived probability of a bailout should affect 
the model’s estimated coefficients in three distinct ways. First, the coefficient on 
the event date dummy should be negative and significant. Second, the slopes of 
the coefficients on other variables should decrease, as investors pay less attention 
to fundamentals in forming their expectations of default probabilities. Third, the 
dispersion of spreads across countries should also decrease, as investors pay less 
attention to differences in macroeconomic fundamentals across countries when 
determining their credit-worthiness. 
Their empirical model is based on a standard bond-spread determination 
model as described in the previous section. They interpret their evidence on the 
Russian default as showing that a significant moral hazard effect existed prior to 
the default (i.e., there was a perceptible shift in market sentiments as regarding the 
likelihood of future defaults). 
As Lane and Phillips (2000) only look at the statistical properties of the 
spreads’ series, Dell’Arricia et al.’s (2002) modeling technique can be seen as 
more convincing. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) note that in order for their testing 
strategy to be valid the event they identify (the Russian default) has to satisfy 
three conditions: (1) It has to change investors’ perceptions on the likelihood or 
the extent of future bailouts; (2) It has to be unexpected; and (3) It must not lead    
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to a reassessment of risks other than through the expectations of future 
international rescues. Whether the third condition holds for the Russian case 
appears debatable, although Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) plausibly claim that the 
Asian crisis of the previous year should have been sufficient to ‘wake up’ 
investors to the dangers of lending to emerging markets so that the Russian default 
did not contain any new information besides the absence of a bailout. 
Additionally, they note that the unraveling of the Russian stabilization program 
and the consequent default, a classic fiscal crisis in a fairly small economy that is 
not tightly connected to the rest of the world, would not have contained any 
information relevant to other emerging markets.  
Nevertheless, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) do not note that their estimation 
strategy, and specifically their usage of infrequent data (quarterly) and large 
window (three quarters) also assumes that the Russian crisis was the only event 
that effected bond spreads systematically between August 1998 and March 1999. 
Their work therefore crucially rests on the assumption that the only event that 
might have affected their dependent variable (spreads) in that 9-month period was 
indeed the Russian default. This does not seem to be the case. In the weeks 
following the Russian default two important and unexpected events occurred: the 
Long-Term-Capital-Management (LTCM) crisis which was partially resolved 
once the New-York Fed orchestrated a private sector bailout of the hedge fund, 
and a dramatic revision downward in expectations for the world economy for 
1999. Another IMF working paper that examined both the Russian Crisis and the 
LTCM one concluded that the LTCM crisis was a very large liquidity shock that    
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affected most countries’ spreads more than the Russian default (Dungey et al., 
2002). Thus, the effects that Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) find on spreads, and which 
they interpret as a weakening of the pre-Russian-default moral hazard, can equally 
be interpreted as caused by the massive decrease in liquidity as a result of the 
LTCM crisis.
7 We discuss this point further in section 5.3. 
In contrast with Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002), our paper employs monthly data, 
financial event study methodology, a different regression technique, and identifies 
more events. These present a more robust estimation methodology and our results 
do seem to be different. 
 
Kamin (2002) 
Kamin (2002) concludes that price (spread) data does not seem to indicate a 
significant moral hazard effect. He then goes on to evaluate two other 
possibilities: (1) that the moral hazard effect manifested itself in increases in 
quantities of capital flows rather than in decreases in prices; and (2) the moral 
hazard effect should be observed, if it exists, more strongly in systemic 
countries—countries that will not be allowed to default by the multilateral 
institutions because of their geo-political or economic importance. 
For the first hypothesis, Kamin (2002) finds little evidence of an increase in 
capital flows as a result of the apparent change in IMF policy after Mexico, 1995. 
Interestingly, his paper does not distinguish between different types of capital 
flows. One would expect to see an increase as a result of a moral hazard effect for 
those types of flows that are more likely to be indeed bailed out. As we 
                                                 
7 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) do note that “…results should be interpreted as confirming a necessary,    
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demonstrated in the previous section, even after differentiating between different 
flows one cannot observe support for a strong moral hazard hypothesis. For 
Kamin’s (2002) second hypothesis—that one would observe a stronger moral 
hazard effect for systemic countries—the results are similar. Once one 
distinguishes, in an admittedly ad hoc manner, between different types of 
countries (in terms of their systemic importance) one cannot observe any 
meaningful difference in either their spreads or the volume of capital flows they 
receive. 
 
3. Event-Study  Methodology 
Financial event-study methodology is outlined in Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1997). By regressing a panel data set that contains standard spread 
determination variables we obtain estimated coefficients for our variables. We 
then use those estimated coefficients to construct estimated ‘abnormal’ spreads 
around event months and examine their statistical properties.  
We use the Lane and Phillips (2000) identification of events and group them 
into four major moral hazard inducing events: 
•  1/1995 : The Mexican Program 
•  8-12/97: Thai, Indonesian and Korean Program + IMF Board’s approval of 
new Structural Reserve Facility and suggestion of quota increase 
•  10-12/98: U.S. Congress ratifies quota increase + IMF approval of a large 
program (600% of quota) for Brazil 
•  3/2000: Large Argentinean Stand-By approved 
                                                                                                                                      
but not sufficient condition for the presence of moral hazard.” (p. 7).    
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We exclude a four month window after each event and therefore estimate our 
'normal' model on the following periods: 1-11/1994, 6/1995-6/1997, 5-6/1998, 
5/1999-1/2000, 6-12/2000.   
We take the probability of a balance-of-payments crisis to be a function of the 
country and time-specific macroeconomic characteristics (Xit) and the external 
environment (X
W). The probability of being repaid if a crisis occurred is assumed 
to be a function of the amount of resources available for repayment (reserves, and 
existing credit lines—X
RES) and the likelihood of IMF bailouts (p
IMF). Initially, 





t it i it u X X X s + + + + = 3 2 1 β β β β    (1) 
Where 
IMF
it u  is an error term that should also reflect p
IMF.  We estimate this model 
for all the estimation window observations (T-1×I×N observations).
8 We use the 
estimated coefficients from this sample to find the parameters of a ‘normal 
spreads’ model – i.e., equation (1).
9  
We then construct 
  β ˆ ' ˆ X s u it
IMF
it − =        (2) 
for all the event window data (T0×I×N observations). We examine the properties 
of the error term 
IMF
it u ˆ  around the event months.
10 By assuming that our normal 
                                                 
8 I is the number of countries and N the number of events. T-1  is the estimations window, T0 is the 
event window, and T1  is the post event window.   
9 This procedure insures that our estimates are not biased because of the changes following these 
events. 
10 This methodology prevents at least one of the problems noted by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) in 
their work; namely that a change in IMF policy that might change the magnitude of the moral 
hazard effect can be expected to change the relationship between other macro variables and the 
spread level (our LHS variable).    
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spreads determination model is fully specified we derive conclusions on the 
probability of payment variable by looking at the statistical qualities of the 
estimated ‘abnormal’ spread around the events days. We repeat this procedure for 
the Russian moral-hazard-reducing default event of August 1998. 
A Durbin-Watson statistic for all iterations of the model strongly indicates 
that the error terms are autocorrelated.
11 We therefore estimate the model using 
the Prais-Winsten algorithm. The Prais-Winsten procedure is a two-step FGLS 
procedure that utilizes the estimated correlation coefficient obtained from the 
Durbin-Watson statistic from the first-stage OLS regression as the initial 
autocorrelation value and reiterates the second step FGLS using the whole sample 




Two data sets on spreads have been previously used:  
•  Indices of emerging market spreads for secondary-market sovereign bonds 
(US$ denominated) over US treasury bills (both average index - the EMBI+ - 
and for 15 individual countries accounting for most foreign currency sovereign 
lending). The index is available from JP Morgan.  
•  Data on issues of individual bonds (both commercial and sovereign) from the 
‘bondware’ database. 
Selectivity bias is a problem with the ‘bondware’ data as the decision whether 
to issue debt is endogenous and dependent on the same variables that supposedly 
affect spreads. Launch spreads are therefore difficult to interpret as an increase in 
                                                 
11 Durbin-Watson statistic is less than 0.5 and the estimated ρ is 0.8.    
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perceived risk can actually cause a decrease in spreads as only the most credit-
worthy issuers stay in the market while riskier borrowers withdraw. A procedure 
to overcome this bias is available – Heckman’s (1979) two step procedure; but, its 
efficacy depends on specifying an accurate model for the launch decision and 
involves proxying for bonds that are not launched (Blundell and Costa-Días, 
2000). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) use this data with the Heckman (1979) procedure 
and obtain insignificant results for the selection bias.
13 We do not use the 
Bondware data.
14  
The JP Morgan data, the EMBI, is more uniform across time and between 
countries and is thus convenient and appropriate for our needs. The countries 
included in the EMBI data set are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
Turkey, and Venezuela.   
As daily data is volatile, we prefer to use an average of daily rates. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) use quarterly averages and examine post-event data 
using a 3-quarter window to prevent the volatility that resulted from the 1998 
Russian default from affecting their results. While there might have been other 
considerations for their choice, it does seem as though monthly data – which we 
use – will smooth the data sufficiently so that valid conclusions can be had.
15  
                                                                                                                                      
12 For technical details see Greene (2000, pp. 546-550) and Greene (2002, E7 pp. 4-7). 
13 As we note in Hutchison and Noy (forthcoming) this can be because there is no selection bias or, 
as seems more likely in this case, because the launch model is inaccurately specified. 
14 Kamin and von Kleist (1999) note that launch spreads are a better measure for borrowing costs 
and will therefore be more appropriate if any conclusions on real costs of the moral hazard effect 
are sought. The question of the real costs of a moral hazard effect is not within the scope of this 
paper. To our knowledge, this question has never been looked at. 
15 There is a tradeoff here. Using daily data will significantly increase the power of tests that use 
event-study methodology. Our problem is both that none of the data we use for our spread 
determination model is readily available on a daily or weekly frequency (or if it is it does not    
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An examination of the JP Morgan data series we use in our estimations (1994-
2000) reveals some interesting observations.  A graph of all the monthly country-
series reveals that spreads peaked first during the beginning of 1995 (the Mexican 
crisis), and were then followed by a continuous and gradual decline of spreads for 
almost all countries up to October 1997 (figure 4). The Asian crisis was followed 
by only a small increase in spreads (relative to the Tequila crisis) and by the 
second quarter of 1998 spreads have gone back to their pre-crisis levels. The rise 
in spreads was much larger and across-the-board during mid 1998 and the Russian 
default. Increases were especially high for Ecuador, Russia and Venezuela but all 
other countries (excluding Poland) experienced large increases comparable to the 
ones in 1995. This period was again followed by a period of decline but even at 
the end of 2000 spreads were still, in general, higher and more dispersed than their 
lowest levels of mid 1997. 
A look at the EMBI+ index (daily rates) in figure 5 reveals a similar story. 
There was a significant increase in December 1994, when the Mexican crisis 
became apparent and the peso was devalued but the highest peak during the whole 
time period shown (1994-2000) was in March 1995 in the aftermath of the 
Mexican crisis. Other peaks can be observed in June 1995, November 1995 and 
March 1996. The index then declined continuously until it started peaking again 
when the Asian crisis started to enfold. A local peak was reached in November 
1997 but increases then were much more moderate than the ones in 1995. The 
EMBI+ index increased rapidly again immediately preceding Russia’s default on 
                                                                                                                                      
change much) and that the event timing is not entirely clear. We are not sure when did markets 
become aware of the impending event – be it a bailout or an absence of one.  See Morse (1984) for    
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its domestic debt on August, 17
th, 1998. Another index, excluding Russia and 
Ecuador shows that spread levels only returned their pre-Russian-crisis levels at 
the beginning of 2000 and did not decrease back to their lowest levels even by the 
end of the year. 
Even at this stage, it is clear why research that focused on the Russian default 
might find moral hazard while papers that examined the previous period could not 
discern such evidence. We examine the Russian default separately in section 5.3. 
 
Some of the macroeconomic data we use in our spread-determination model 
are not available monthly (although inflation rates, for example, are available in 
monthly frequencies for the whole sample). Still, the model assumes the affect of 
macroeconomic data on spreads through its affect on expected default 
probabilities (through the information set available to investors). Thus, using 
quarterly data in a monthly panel for some of the variables does not pose a 
conceptual problem. We require the variables observed by international investors 
when they determine the likelihood of default and if these are available only in 
quarterly frequency they should be sufficient - provided attention is paid to when 
variables become public knowledge.  
Our baseline model includes variables that measure the liquidity of the country 
and its ability to repay in the short run (debt to GDP, net foreign assets, reserves to 
GDP and current account flows to exports), and other macroeconomic variables 
commonly used to assess creditworthiness (inflation rate, high inflation dummy, 
fiscal deficit to GDP and export growth). To proxy for institutional and political 
                                                                                                                                      
discussion of using daily vs. weekly or monthly data, and Lee and Varela (1997) for event day    
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variables that are used by investors in assessing risk we use Standard & Poor’s 
sovereign credit ratings. As these ratings are correlated with the other 
macroeconomic variables we use, and in order to prevent bias in our estimates, we 
use only the orthogonal component of the credit rating variable.
16 We also use two 
variables to proxy for the world economic conditions as these affect emerging 
markets (US Federal Funds rate and developing countries exports' price index). 
For data sources and for details on our use of the S&P’s credit ratings see 
appendices A and B, respectively. 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Moral Hazard Inducing Events 
We begin by assuming that market participants possess perfect foresight (i.e., 
t t t X X E = −1 ). We regress our panel for the pre-events periods (estimation 
window) without lagging any of the explanatory variables. Results are given in 
Table 1 column (1). 
While most coefficients have plausible signs only several are significant. But, 
importantly for our model, the adjusted R
2 from this regression is high (0.64). The 
relatively high explanatory power will therefore enable us to better identify the 
abnormal returns in the event-window data. 
Using these results we obtain abnormal returns as specified in equation (2). 
We examine the abnormal returns computed for the periods of interest: 
•  2-5/95- following Mexico 
                                                                                                                                      
uncertainty.  
16 For a recent discussion on credit ratings and default probabilities see Reinhart (2002).    
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•  1-4/98- following East Asia 
•  1-4/99- following Brazil 
•  2-5/00- following Argentina  
In the perfect foresight case no evidence of moral hazard is present. In almost 
all cases the averages of the abnormal returns across countries, and by periods, are 
negative. A presence of a significant moral hazard effect should have resulted in 
positive abnormal returns (as the estimated spreads should have been higher than 
actual spreads). Results are reported in table 2. These conclusions do not change if 
we exclude the crisis countries (Mexico, Korea, Philippines, Russia, Brazil and 
Argentina) during their respective crises (table 3). Notably, outliers do not drive 
these findings. Almost all, and in some cases virtually all, abnormal returns are 
negative. 
Separately, we compute abnormal returns without relying on the previously 
used perfect information assumption. We regress our baseline model with lagged 
variables (assuming  1 1 − − = t t t X X E ).
17 Results are reported in table 1 column (2). 
The predictive power of our equation stays similar and we construct abnormal 
returns using eq. (2). Once more, the averages of the abnormal returns across 
countries, and by periods, are negative and a presence of a significant moral 
hazard effect is not detected (table 4).  
By assuming normal distribution of the error term under the null hypothesis of 
no moral hazard we can use simple t-statistics to identify ‘abnormal’ – i.e., moral 
hazard – effects. In none of the results reported can the null of no moral hazard be    
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rejected. For a non-parametric (distribution free) test, we use the sign test (as in 
MacKinlay et al., 1997) but arrive at the same conclusions; no rejection of the 'no 
moral hazard' null. This is not to say that no moral hazard effect exists. Based on 
these findings, we can conclude that the large bailouts of the 1990s either did not 
create an additional effect or alternatively the additional moral hazard effect it 
created is hidden behind repeatedly worsening worldwide outlook. We find this 
second possibility hard to believe for much of the time period we examined. 
 
5.2 Daily Data 
In an attempt to better identify the effects of specific events, we pursue the 
same exercise but with daily data. The only variables that are available on a daily 
basis are the interest rates and the S&P credit rating variables. Yet, these are not 
sufficient to estimate a powerful enough 'normal' model and enable a more 
detailed look on the evolution of 'abnormal returns' around moral-hazard-inducing 
events. Even though the adjusted R
2 is 0.40, the inclusion of the S&P ratings and 
interest rates does not contribute much to the explanatory power of the model 
beyond the country-specific fixed effects.
18  
As a first pass, it is worth noting that while spreads started increasing for 
Russia almost a week before it defaulted, other countries spreads mostly started 
increasing rapidly on August 20
th, after the default was announced. It is still 
necessary, though, to attempt to distinguish between the effect of the perceived 
                                                                                                                                      
17 We assessed the frequency with which variables are published and lagged most variables 3 
months (1 quarter) while, for example, lagging the inflation variables only one month. We 
experimented with other lags but results were very similar. 
18 An F-test cannot reject the null that these variables are jointly insignificant.    
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'bad news' on the world economy and the 'moral hazard' effect of the default - an 
exercise we discuss in the next section.  
 
5.3 The Russian Default (August, 1998) 
Not surprisingly, the evidence on the Russian default is different. As we have 
already observed, spreads clearly increased substantially following the Russian 
default. Our procedure shows that these increases were significantly larger than 
what actual changes in the macroeconomic variables we controlled for predicted. 
Averages of abnormal returns following the Russian default are large, negative, 
and highly significantly different from zero (table 5). This, of course, can be 
interpreted as evidence that the Russian default occasioned investors to reduce 
their expectations of future bailouts and reduced the moral hazard effect.  
Many observers of the Russian crisis seem to agree that a moral hazard effect 
was indeed a major driving force in directing large amounts of capital into the 
Russian debt market prior to the crisis. Russia was taken to be the model case of 
the ‘too large to fail’ doctrine (or the ‘too nuclear to fail doctrine’).
19 What is more 
interesting is that when the international multilateral organizations failed to 
intervene in August 1998 and Russia defaulted on its domestic bonds, other 
countries spreads increased substantially as well. It seems that international 
investors did take the absence of intervention to mean that the IMF might no 
                                                 
19 For a detailed chronology of the fiscal crisis that led to the Russian default and its aftermath, see 
Kharas et al. (2001). Kharas et al. (2001) assert “Portfolio investors might have been anticipating a 
large bailout that would at least postpone a crisis and keep their one-way bet for a few more 
lucrative months” (p. 42). They quote market commentary from the same time to support their 
claim.     
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longer be willing to intervene during other countries’ crises, as well. This is 
Dell’Arricia et al.’s (2000) interpretation.  
Yet, the increase in spreads can also be accounted for by a major revision of 
expectations on the part of investors. While Dell’Arricia et al. discount this 
possibility, the IMF reported, in its World Economic Outlook of October 1998:   
International economic and financial conditions have 
deteriorated considerably in recent months as recessions have 
deepened in many Asian emerging market economies and Japan, 
and as Russia’s financial crisis has raised the specter of default. 
Negative spillovers have been felt in world stock markets, 
emerging market interest spreads, acute pressures on several 
currencies, and further drops in already weak commodity 
prices….World growth of only 2 percent is now projected for 
1998, a full percentage point less than expected in the May 
1998 World Economic Outlook and well below trend growth. 
Chances of any significant improvement in 1999 have also 
diminished, and the risks of a deeper, wider, and more 
prolonged downturn have escalated. 
 
Williamson (2001) uses even stronger language: “The weeks following the 
collapse of the Russian program marked the apogee of the most dangerous 
economic crisis that the world has seen in recent decades.” (p. 60).  
In our empirical work detailed in the two previous subsections, we controlled 
for credit ratings in attempt to control for the macro-economic outlook but these 
ratings are notoriously sluggish and are typically revised downward only ex-post 
(see Reinhart, 2002). Our inability to control for emerging markets’ economic 
outlook might be the reason behind our findings for the Russian case.
20 We 
discuss this issue further in the next section. 
                                                 
20 This does not preclude the possibility that the reason why there was a worsening outlook for the 
world economy was exactly the presumption that large multilateral bailouts will no longer be 
forthcoming. This possibility, on the one hand, reinstates the moral hazard hypothesis, but, on the 
other hand, it suggests a powerful incentive for the multilateral lending institutions to continue 
maintaining a moral hazard effect through bailout guarantees. One can doubt this interpretation as 




5.4 The Argentinean Default (December, 2001) 
The recent dramatic events in Argentina are, from this paper's perspective, 
immensely interesting. As we detailed in the previous section, any conclusions 
obtained from the Russian non-bailout case are fragile, as we cannot differentiate 
between the effect of the non-bailout event for Russia, the LTCM crisis, and the 
general worsening outlook for the world economy. The events surrounding the 
Argentinean default represent a Russia-like absence of international bailout but in 
the absence of any other major financial crisis or much worsening world economic 
outlook (both of which were concurrent with the Russian case). Thus, the events 
surrounding the Argentine crisis offer us a perfect test case for the validity of the 
moral hazard argument. While Argentina does not appear to fit, as does Russia the 
‘too nuclear to fail’ argument, the international bilateral financial institutions were 
heavily invested in the success of the Argentinean economy both because it was 
looked upon as very important to the region (to MERCOSUR and more broadly, 
Latin America), and specifically as a major test-case—or a poster child—for the 
new liberalization program, the ‘Washington Consensus’ policies advocated by 
the IMF throughout the 1990s.
21 Thus, one could reasonably expect the IMF to 
bail out Argentina in case such an action was deemed to have a positive likelihood 
of succeeding. We briefly detail the events in Argentina and then go on to 
examine the evidence. Our description of events is based on Powell (2003). 
                                                                                                                                      
to increase IMF quotas (Oct. 1998). Both of these should have alloyed fears that bailouts will no 
longer be forthcoming. 
21 For such an argument, see Pastor and Wise (2001).    
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There is an almost universal agreement that the roots of the Argentinean 
crisis were in mismanaged fiscal policy going back to the end of the 1990s. But, 
even in the first quarter of 2001, the government’s fiscal position did not appear to 
require more than a relatively mild adjustment (economically, but not, as it turned 
out, politically). Argentina’s problems started to compound as a result of the 
Russian crisis, the Brazilian recession, falls in commodity prices (especially 
agricultural exports) and the Brazilian devaluation in January 1999. In October 
1999, and after much political infighting inside the ruling Peronist Party (under 
the then President Menem), a new president from the opposition Radical Party 
was elected (De la Ruá). In it’s first year in office, the De la Ruá government 
implemented a tax increase in an attempt to improve the government’s fiscal 
position. The ensuing recession led both to political turmoil (and growing 
opposition to the tax increases) and to a worsening of the interest burden the 
government had to pay on much of its debt (most of it short-term); the two 
reinforced each other. By the end of 2000, the government negotiated a support 
package from the IMF and other multilateral institutions (totaling approximately 
$30bn). After replacing the economy minister, the government announced a plan 
of major cuts in public expenditures, but this program was derailed and resulted in 
another change in the economy ministry (now to be headed by the original 
architect of the Argentinean Convertibility Plan – Domingo Cavallo). 
After several attempts at heterodox economic policies in an attempt to calm 
international investors and prevent a bank run, and after the sacking of the Central 
Bank’s president by the Senate, the situation did not improve. A mega-swap of    
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debt was then initiated leading to a lengthening of maturities at the price of higher 
interest rates (The Russian government attempted a similar swap that was 
designed to change the maturity and currency structure of its debt in July, 1998).  
On June 15
th, Cavallo announced a complicated system of subsidies and 
tariffs that amounted to a ‘dual exchange rate regime.’ Since this was in clear 
contravention of previous IMF advice it was widely expected that the IMF would 
withdraw.
22 Several weeks of financial turmoil ensued but an agreement with the 
IMF was reached on August 21
st. The new agreement provided additional 
financing ($5bn), beyond the amounts agreed to a year and a half earlier.
23 This 
program appeared to be a strong indication of the IMF’s willingness and 
commitment to aid Argentina in its fiscal adjustment; and by extension, of its 
continued commitment to providing multilateral bailouts in spite of strong 
objections from the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
24  
The Argentinean authorities started publicly discussing an orderly (read: not 
voluntary) debt restructuring in November; a bank run ensued and the authorities 
imposed strict capital controls and restrictions on deposit withdrawals (known as 
the ‘corralito’). On December 5
th the IMF refused to provide a $1.3bn loan 
installment and after another failed attempt to reach an agreement (on December 
17
th) the political situation quickly deteriorated, De la Ruá’s government was 
swept from office by massive street protests and Argentina defaulted on its debt 
                                                 
22 “A common view was then that the de facto dual exchange rate might be the final straw to break 
relations with the Fund” (Powell, 2003). 
23 The program also included additional resources from the World Bank, the IADB and private 
sector international banks. 
24 One possibly important difference was that the IMF now seemed to have been supportive of the 
idea of a voluntary restructuring of Argentina’s debt. Thus, while the bailout might have been 
intended to facilitate that debt restructuring, it still entailed some losses for international investors; 
the IMF did not attempt to provide a full bailout to international investors.    
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(under the tutelage of its new president Rodriguez Saá – whose government lasted 
for one week). 
 
In the face of growing criticism of large bailout programs, especially coming 
from the U.S. administration, the IMF’s commitment through most of 2001 to 
support the Argentine government (and especially the August signing of a new 
agreement) was an important signal to the markets. Thus, one would expect that if 
a moral hazard exists in international debt markets that spreads would have 
decreased following the August announcement and increased following the 
abandonment of Argentina and its political and economic collapse in December of 
the same year.  
An examination of Figure 6 reveals no such dynamics. If anything, there was 
a slight increase in other countries’ spreads following the August announcement 
and a possibly more significant, but not uniform, decrease in spreads following the 
Argentinean political collapse and default in December. Whatever the merits of 
the argument supporting a moral hazard criticism of the IMF for the periods 
following the Mexican and East Asian crisis, it is evident that no change in 
perceptions attributable to a moral hazard effect can be found in the price 
dynamics of international debt for 2001-2002. 
  
6. Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
We argued that a moral hazard created through a bailout guarantee will 
possibly lead to any of the following: (1) An increase in amounts lent; (2) a    
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decrease in the price of loans so that it no longer reflects the true (insurance-free) 
risk borne; (3) a change in the composition of investment away from uninsured 
investment to insured flows; (4) a change in the composition of international 
portfolios away from less risky but less profitable investment opportunities to 
more risky but more profitable if outcomes are positive; and (5) a shift in the 
international allocation of resources to countries that are deemed more systemic 
and therefore more likely to be bailed out. 
We employed various statistical methodologies and observed various data 
sources and have been unable to find much evidence consistent with these effects 
of IMF policies between 1994 and 2002.  We re-investigate the evidence 
surrounding the event that is used by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) to provide support 
for a moral hazard hypothesis and argue that their finding is consistent with a 
different hypothesis, which we consider much more likely, and present evidence 
to that effect.  
Naturally, a failure to reject the null of no-change-in moral-hazard is not the 
same as arguing that there is no moral hazard created by IMF lending practices. 
Three possibilities arise: (1) our statistical tests are not powerful enough; (2) there 
is no quantitatively significant (observable) moral hazard effect; or (3) the 
perceptions of the likelihood of bailouts did not change following the Mexican, 
and other large bailouts or their absence in other instances, and had been relatively 
constant over the last decade. The last possibility does not imply that the moral 
hazard effect is insignificant but rather that it is relatively unchanging and had 
been around for longer than our sample period (1994-2002).     
32
 
We lastly consider some possible extensions to the empirical work applied 
here. Extending the analysis to the pre-1994 era and investigating whether one can 
observe any change in international flows prior to that date might provide us with 
information related to the third possibility. The paucity of pre-1994 data on 
spreads prevented us from undertaking this exercise but constructing datasets that 
will be suitable for such an analysis seems possible.  
A shortcoming of our event study approach is that the event choices are ad-
hoc. In our case, these are based on ‘popular’ perceptions of which IMF bailouts 
actually surprised international markets and therefore affected measured spreads. 
An alternative strategy might be based on identifying these surprise-events by 
employing results from the literature that looks at the likelihoods of participation 
in IMF programs (e.g., Conway, 1994; Hutchison, 2003; Hutchison and Noy, 
forthcoming; and Knight and Santaella, 1997). Cases where the likelihood to 
participate are below a certain threshold but a program was actually observed can 
then be identified as surprises. While this algorithm does not contain an ad-hoc 
component it assumes a satisfactory predictive capacity for the empirical 
participation model. Yet, the explanatory power of these models is generally weak 
and these do not capture the relative, and possibly unquantifiable, importance of 
various programs in changing market perceptions. 
Lastly, data on disaggregated capital flows by their type and most importantly 
by their country of origin might provide us with more information and might be 
enable us to support (or refute) our findings. Aizenman and Noy (2003) discuss 
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A - Data 
 Variable    Code    Source 
Liquidity and solvency variables: 
•  Debt to GDP ratio     DBTGDP    IFS 85A.ZF   
  
•  Net foreign assets    NETFAS    IFS 11.ZF, 16C.ZF 
•  Reserves to GDP ratio    FXRGDP    IFS 1D.DZF 
•  Current account flows  
relative to exports     CAEXP    IFS 78ALD.ZF 
Macroeconomic variables: 
•  Inflation rate       CPI      IFS 64.XZF 
•  High inflation dummy 
(CPI>30)     CPID 
•  Fiscal deficit to GDP ratio GOVGDP    IFS  80.ZF 
•  Export  growth    DLEX    IFS  70.DZF 
•  Credit ratings  
(S & P’s Credit Ratings)   RESRTNG    see appendix B 
External variables: 
•  US Federal Funds rate    USRATE    IFS 60.BZF 
•  Developing countries  
exports' price index     EXPP      IFS 20174.DZF    
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S&P’s short-term foreign currency credit ratings are taken from: 
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Table 2 - Abnormal Spreads – Averages for Post Event Data 
Perfect Foresight Normal Model - OLS 
  Mean  STD  Min Max  N 
Following Moral Hazard 
inducing events 
-107.2  1505.1 -2708.2 1144.8  108 
1 month following event  -132.4  1203.9  -2708.2  583.3  27 
2 months following event  -160.0  1209.7  -2698.9  752.8  27 
3 months following event  -107.0  1243.0  -2558.3  1144.8  27 
4 months following event  -29.7  1275.2  -1883.0  1107.0  27 
 
 
 Table 3 - Abnormal Spreads – Averages for Post Event Data 
Perfect Foresight Model - Excluding Same-Country Crisis Observations 
  Mean  STD  Min Max  N 
Following Moral Hazard 
inducing events  -78.8 702.2  -2907.5  1129.7 100 
1 month following event  -99.7  726.8 -2907.5 793.6  25 
2 months following event  -113.4  740.7 -2865.6 795.4  25 
3 months following event  -76.6 731.4  -2720.5  1129.7  25 
4 months following event  -25.6 646.2  -2053.4  1091.2  25 
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Table 4 - Abnormal Spreads – Averages for Post Event Data 
Model with Lagged Variables - Excluding Same-Country Observations 
 Mean  STD  Min  Max  N 
Following Moral Hazard 
inducing events  -85.2 858.6  -3694.0  1465.5 100 
1 month following event  -90.7 940.3  -3694.0  1465.5  25 
2 months following event  -118.0  904.9 -3665.1 974.2  25 
3 months following event  -107.0  862.2 -3474.4 885.4  25 
4 months following event  -24.9 767.7  -2816.8  1327.0  25 
 
 
Table 5 - Abnormal Spreads – Averages for Post Russian Default Data 
 Mean  STD  Min  Max  N 
Perfect Foresight Model 
Month Following Russian 
Default  -368.5 314.8  -1095.7 53.9  10 
2-4 months following 
Russian Default  57.6 301.0  -613.8  585.2  27 
Model with Lagged Variables 
Month Following Russian 
Default  -337.5  467.3 -1108.7 695.1  10 
2-4 months following 
Russian Default  10.8 467.9  -880.0  857.6  27 
 
 
 